After the uprighting operation was completed and the rig secured ultimo September 1983 the platform was made ready for inspection. First the platform was searched for corpses which was one of the objectives for the uprighting. In order to do this the platform was cleaned out. Ceilings had fallen down during capsizing and uprighting attempts, furniture and loose equipment were in a mess. This work was done by operators controlled by the uprighting contractor Stolt Nielsen. The Stavanger Police was responsible for guard and security onboard. As soon as the platform was ready for inspection the Commission went onboard. Inspection by other parties were by the Commission organized to Oct. 13th 1983.
Photo 6.2.1: <<Kielland>>
uprighted.
In my book about the "Sabotage against Kielland" published in
1992 I am telling the reader that there was a "cleaning up" operation
on the platform before the police came onboard. The information is obtained
later on by trustworthy people. This makes the results of the inspection
very uncertain although some of the technical findings are selfexplanatory.
It is doubtful that the clean-up operation was the single responsibility
of the uprighting contractor. Members of the Police and the Commission
are most likely involved.
Part of the clean-up is said to be removal of narcotics stored in the catering area. Information by others tells that <<Kielland>> was used as transit for narcotics from Scotland to Norway. The Stavanger Police Department should have a file about narcotics on <<Kielland>>. This file was not among the documents presented during persual of documents in June 1986. Question about this fact was raised to the District Attorney without any satisfactory reply. It is still a question why The Police during their inspection onboard was stopped from using narcotic dogs in their search.
An other objective of the clean-up operation was likely to mislead the results of the technical inspection, among others open hatches and doors, clean cut holes and removals . Several questions was raised as result of the inspection on Oct. 13th 1983.
The inspection was organized in three different groups:
- PPCO/Stavanger Drilling/Insurance Companies (Oil Risk Pool)
- CFEM/Forex neptun
- Kiellandfondet/Sjøfartsdirektoratet/DnV/Stavanger Police
Photo 6.2.2; Boarding <<Kielland>>
for inspection.
Photo 6.2.3; Commission members.
Photo 6.2.4; Inspection Group.
Photo 6.2.5; Representatives for Oil Risk Pool (Storebrand).
As part of the last group I requested to inspect the underside
of the platform. Boat was made available for the group. Inspection was
confined by two large barges supporting the deck at each end. Several holes
in the deck were observed as well as bent and tvisted stiffeners located
in the same area. The holes we were told was cut to drain the lower deck
after uprighting. Later I was made aware of DnV report 81-829 Diving
Survey of A.L.K., ref.
Section 2.4; Damages on deck.
Most of the bracing breaking points were below water.
Only breaking point TD3 at node 3 and breaking point TD4 at node 4 were
above water as shown on photo 6.2.6 and 6.2.7. At node 4 a hole was observed
in bracing D4 as shown on photo 6.2.7.
Photo 6.2.6; Breaking point TD3.
Photo 6.2.7; Node 4 with breaking point TD4 and hole in bracing D4.
As shown on photo 6.2.7 there are ladders and
gangways going from deck down and around the node and bracing for inspection
purposes. It's possible to stand in the ladder and touch the hole.
6.2.1 Discussion of hole
in bracing D4.
The walls on the B-leg staircase tower were compressed. Obviously
the door must have been shut when the rig capsized. Outer waterpressure
have buckled the tower walls. The walls on the E-leg tower were, however,
not compressed. The doorframe is distorted half way up and inbetween the
two door handles as shown on photos.
Photo 6.2.10; B-leg tower staircase.
Photo 6.2.11; E-leg tower staircase.
The E-door must have been open letting water in equilizing the pressure.
The distorted doorframe and door indicates that something has kept the
door from being closed by the water flowing into the E-leg. In the Commissions
report on page 249 it is reported that the E-door was shut. It is possible
that hindering the E-door from closing was a part of the sabotage operation.
The weightdistrbution on the platform had an effect on tilting and consequently
waterflow into the E-leg. The distortion of the port mudsilos indicate
that these silos were empty while the mudsilos on starboard must have contained
some less compressible medium as shown on photos 6.2.12 and 6.2.13.
Photo 6.2.12; Port silos above deck.
Photo 6.2.13; Starboard silos above deck.
Opening the manholes on top of the silos proved all to be empty. While
the inner walls of the distorted port silos were heavily rusty, the inner
walls of the starboard silos were bright metal. Something had kept the
starboard silos from collapsing and at the same time preserved the inner
walls. Pictures are taken of the port silos on intermediate deck below
upperdeck.
Photo 6.1.14; Port Silos below upper deck.
Photo 6.1.12; Port silos below upper deck, second
view.
The deck and broken piping from the silos were covered by some brownish stuff which looked like mud. Samples were taken for examination. Tests performed at Rogalandsforskning gave no reliable answer. The ceiling of the deck was however not covered by this stuff. Conclusivly the stuff had not been floating around while the platforme was capsized. It is likely to believe that the starboard silos were emptied as part of the clean-up operation. There were signs that the bolts to the manholes on top of starboard silos recently had been opened. From a stability point of view one should expect an equal number of silos filled on each side, port and starboard. Why the starboard silos were filled and not the port ones might have had an effect on the tilting of the platform after the D-leg broke away. The platform tilted and capsized towards staboard. As such this might also have been part of the sabotage operation. Furthermore pictures taken of the platform shortly before the disaster shows the crownblock hanging in the top of the derrick. This further worsened the situation after the platform started tilting. Picture presented in left wing press Klassekampen. Was this also a part of the operation?
Pictures are included showing part of the Living Quarters
and the fixings of quarter containers to deck during final uprighting.
Photo 6.1.13: Living Quarter containers on<<Kielland>>.
Photo 6.1.14: Fixings of quarters to deck during uprighting.
A lot of documents were still onboard the platform. These
were taken care of by the French constructor CFEM. The Commission had no
interest - "nothing more to find".
Photo 6.1.15; Documents of no interest to the Commission.
Photo 6.1.16; Documents shipped to France.
